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COMPLETE LIST OF PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
The persons involved on this appeal include Appellant Dena Stewart ("Ms.
Stewart"), and Appellee Barton Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. ("BWHOA").
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78A-3-102(4), and 78A-4-103(2)(j) because this is a matter transferred by the Utah
Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1:

A trial court may not issue advisory opinions that adjudicate moot
questions; trial courts must resolve active conflicts between the
parties to litigation. BWHOA, based upon applicable homeowner's
covenants, sued Ms. Stewart for injunctive relief requiring her to
remedy several alterations she had made to property she owned in
the Barton Woods Subdivision, specifically Lot 109, commonly
referred to as 962 South Terrace Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010 (the
"Property"). After the lawsuit began, Ms. Stewart surrendered the
Property in bankruptcy, and the subsequent owner voluntarily
remedied the alterations, rendering BWHOA's complaint moot.
Could the trial court decide BWHOA's moot complaint? Issue
preserved at Record page 981 (transcript of December 2, 2010 oral
argument at page 29 line 22 through page 34 line 11).

Standard of review: The correctness of the trial court's decision not to decide a moot
dispute is a legal question, and is reviewed for correctness. See CECO Corp. v. Concrete
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake
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City Corp,, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 131 P.2d
225, 229 (Utah 1987); and Scharfv. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
ISSUE NO. 2:

For a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the plaintiff must have
standing to pursue the asserted claim. Ms. Stewart, relying upon
rights created by the applicable homeowner's covenants and based
upon her status as the owner of the Property, counterclaimed against
BWHOA, alleging only two causes of action, both stemming from
the covenants, conditions and restrictions that ran with the Property
(the "CC&Rs"). Ms. Stewart then abandoned the Property in
bankruptcy and admitted to the trial court that she no longer had
standing to maintain actions based upon the CC&Rs. Could the trial
court entertain Ms. Stewart's counterclaims after admitting that
she had no standing? Issue preserved at Record page 981
(transcript at page 15 line 14 through page 16 line 7, and page 17
line 10 through page 18 line 5).

Standard of review: The correctness of the trial court's decision not to decide a
counterclaim in which the counterclaimant lacks standing is a legal question, and is
reviewed for correctness. See CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967,
969 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887
(Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); and
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
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ISSUE NO. 3:

A party is generally entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs
only if she is the prevailing party and the award of fees and costs is
permitted by either statute or contract. Although the CC&Rs allow
for the recovery of attorneys' fees in limited circumstances, Ms.
Stewart has not prevailed on any of her counterclaims or in
defending against BWHOA's complaint. Could the trial court
award attorneys 'fees to Ms. Stewart as a non-prevailing party?
Issue preserved at Record page 981 (transcript at page 29 line 22
through page 34 line II).

Standard of Review: A trial court's decisions regarding the award of attorneys' fees is
reviewed for patent error or clear abuse of discretion. See City Consumer Services, Inc. v.
Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (see Addendum A).

2.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (see Addendum B).

3.

Rules 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see Addendum

C, D, E, F, G, and H).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition.
The trial court dismissed both BWHOA's complaint and Ms. Stewart's

counterclaims because, as a result of Ms. Stewart's surrender of the Property in
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bankruptcy, the complaint is moot and Ms. Stewart lacks standing to pursue her
counterclaims. That is the judgment from which Ms. Stewart has appealed.
In December 2007, BWHOA filed a complaint against Ms. Stewart seeking
declaratory relief and an injunction requiring Ms. Stewart to remove and remedy several
alterations to the Property that did not conform with the CC&Rs for the Barton Woods
Subdivision. BWHOA simultaneously filed a lis pendens on the Property.
Instead of remedying the violations, Ms. Stewart counterclaimed, alleging that
BWHOA enforced the CC&Rs in a discriminatory and/or inconsistent fashion, and asking
that the trial court order BWHOA to "promptly cover with brick, wood, or stucco, all
windows and glass or metal doors, and other apertures in the exterior of all structures in
the subdivision not now covered with brick, wood or stucco. . . ." She also claimed
$250,000.00 from BWHOA for damages caused by alleged encroachments by neighbors
upon the Property.
Ms. Stewart never amended her pleadings to include any other allegations or
causes of action, and the deadline for doing so passed on July 30, 2010.
Instead of commencing discovery, in March 2008 Ms. Stewart filed a motion for
summary judgment (the "First Motion for Summary Judgment"), arguing that BWHOA
had discriminated against her or had abandoned the CC&Rs. BWHOA filed a cross
motion for summary judgment, which was followed by Ms. Stewart filing a motion to
strike the lis pendens. The trial court ultimately denied all of these motions, holding that
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there were qucMions oi !<^ . e l u d i n g summaryjudgim m . u cmier part\. an*:
cc f li in i lit ig tf i€ pi opi iety of tl le lis / pendens
In January 2009, again before any discovery had been conducted, Ms. Stewart filed
another motion for summary judgment (the "Second Motion for Summary Judgment"),
w 1 licl i. asset ted tf i„e sat i ie ai gi n i lei its tl lat 1 lad failed i.i I tl i„e F ii st Motioi :t for Si immary
Judgment. Before the trial court decided the Second Motioi i. for Si in imary Ji ldgi nei it., I" Is
Stewart filed for Uiapler I ; bankruptcy protection in April 2009. On July 3 1 , _009, Lie
trial, court denied the Second Motion, for Summary Judgment, and stayed the proceedings
in liglil ' 'I "' K Slew.ill's biirki 111ill >„
I Ills order, however, did not stop M s . Stewart from filing an unsuccessful motion
for reconsideration, itI which she raised for the first link ihe factually unsupj •;•

o

argument n,.ii •-/ h . \ nad ^oineliow uui'vcd <tii ^l n , .unis <>i muition except thnt
•

'MI. . *

-

I

•

••

!

'

' M i ; n ; c ,'' •

;

On September 8, 2009, Judge R. Kimball Mosier of the United States Bankruptcy
Coiirt for the District of I Jtah signed an uncontested order confirming M s . Stewart's
CI laptei 13 bai i,,k, ,i i iptcy plai i In tl mt oi dei , Judge I"v losiei stated tl ia„t IV Is. Stew at t had
surrendered the Property to one of her creditors. ^ 11 e r : u. .;: •. i >; i v • ' \ h . V •,.-..?-.
March 11. 2010. .ti m 30 a.iiu the Property was sold ai -\ ntn-judicial foreclosure sale.
Si, >i\ uiki liiv. .*>. c l o s u r e sale, the purchaser, or one of the purchaser's successors in
inh'iv^i

- -! . .

-
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i

After receiving an order lifting the bankruptcy stay, the trial court signed a
stipulated case management order, which, among other things, set July 30, 2010 as the
deadline for filing motions to amend the pleadings. July 30, 2010 passed without Ms.
Stewart seeking any leave to amend her pleadings to add claims of wrongful lien or
abusive litigation.
Because of the foreclosure sale, on August 17, 2010, BWHOA filed a notice
releasing the lis pendens.
On August 24, 2010, even though no discovery had occurred aside from Ms.
Stewart's production of a two-page initial disclosure statement, Ms. Stewart filed yet
another Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Third Motion for Summary
Judgment").
In response, BWHOA filed a motion to dismiss the litigation in its entirety or in
the alternative for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that its complaint should be
dismissed because the Property had been sold and the objectionable alterations remedied,
mooting BWHOA's claims. BWHOA also argued that Ms. Stewart's counterclaims
should be dismissed because, as a result of surrendering the Property in Bankruptcy, Ms.
Stewart no longer had standing.
On December 2, 2010, at oral argument, Ms. Stewart's counsel admitted that Ms.
Stewart no longer had the right to seek injunctive relief or damages for encroachment.
Record at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 15 line 14 through
page 16 line 7, and page 17 line 10 through page 18 line 5) (emphasis added).

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Regarding the I hird Motion lor Summary Judgn lent, tl le trial court agreed w illi
B W H O A, disi i lissed BW 1 10 '\ \s coi i iplaii it ai id N Is. Ste 1 * > at It's coi n itei claii i i, ai id dei lie d a
contractual award of attorney's fees and costs to Ms. S t ^ w u i . K. a. J 8 I (transcript at
page 29 line 22 through page 34 line 11) A nd It !•• frc
tl le otl lei dei lials of si in n i lai y ji idgi i ie;t it

' h \ decision

i lot froi i I ai i> of

tl lat I \ Is. Stewai t appealed.

I hus, the issues as presented In Ms. Slewarl are nol. and i.mnoi In; ( i| pl,i\ m Mir.
appeal. ' I he trial court's judgment is based upon niooti less and lack of standing, not upon
any interpretation of the CC&Rs or their history, or upon any arguments that B W H O A
1: las ei igaged ii i ai ry type of in ipi ope i litigatioi i
. Nevertheless, M s . Stewart is once again i n HIM u> move ioi >./ • *•; s
the substance of the claims, this time shrouding her moihm in die guise of an appellate
mu i.
• Kcgardi.

. I * v • *•

• • -i: . u •

• '

!

- •>

Ms Stew ai tl las

no standing to pursue her counterclaims. 1 huo, the trial court's dismissal was correct and
shoi lid be upheld.
II.

Siadn mi • ill i I IK i d s . • '
4.

"- •

M s . Stewart is the former owner of die h

e *v e e M- ,! r.> • \

of the Bartoi I Woods plain led i init development located ii i Davis County, Utah, and 962
S^-. .. I eri*ace ! ) n \ e , Bountiful, I Jtah 84010. Record at 2, 56, and 64.
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5.

All lots in the Barton Woods planned unit development (the "Barton Woods

PUD") are subject to the CC&Rs, which were originally recorded with the Davis County
Recorder on January 19, 1993. R. at 2-3, 9-38, 56, and 64.
6.

The CC&Rs state that restrictive covenants "shall run with the subject

property and be binding on all parties having any rights, title or interest in that subject
property or any part thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns, and shall inure to the
benefit of each owner thereof." R. at 3, 13, 56, and 64.
7.

The CC&Rs give BWHOA, as the homeowners association, the power to

"control all construction, improvements, and landscaping on the Project to ensure
consistency and compatibility of all improvements and landscaping on the Project." R. at
3, 19-20, 56, and 64.
8.

The CC&Rs also require "prior written approval" from the Management

Committee of the Association before any improvements are constructed. R. at 3, 20, 56,
and 64.
9.

Paragraph 5.3 of the CC&Rs states that "[a]ll buildings, alterations,

improvements, additions and maintenance on the Subject Property shall be made in a
workmanlike manner and shall be architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project."
R. at 3, 20, 56, and 64.
10.

On April 21, 1997, BWHOA recorded amended CC&Rs ("Amended

CC&Rs"). R. at 3, 40-46, 56, and 64.

8
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11.

I he \\ i :iei ided CC&Rs placed arcl litectui all conti ol o\ ei the subdiv isioi :t in a

"Design Review Committee/'' R. at 4, 40, 56, and 64.
12.

The purpose of the Design Review Conii nittee is to ""create, maintain a n d

improve Barton Woods Planned I Jn.it D e v e l o p m e n t as n pleasant ~nd dc^irahV
e:t r -• ii o:t :n i ie:i: it, I: ::) establisl I ai id presei: ve a 1 u u n: u ):i nc )i is uesigi i !c )r i i le < :on n i n ii: iii:;; ' ai id t ::: •
protect a n d p r o m o t e the v a l u e o f the Property, exterior design, landscaping .rn

h.-iiiics

(•i dienitious to t h e existing use o f the Proper! v " ";: <\- i 4 0 . 56. and f»4.
13

1 1 ic CC&Rs regulate the exterior of the dw ellm^N m the subdr T H~n-

exterioi of all bi lildii tgs v • ill be coi isti I icted of bricl :: oi :t 1:1: le f -

ttru

:-i

c
•

being w ood, stucco and/or sucl i other materials authorized by the [Design Review
Committee]." R d 1 17. 56. and 64.
14

* ,,,.-.

Oi tills j U v ! i n :•• • K ' s

, AW ^ \ iVK > stales Uwo ' . • ,mv party governed . • die terms
. .

;

"

• • ' J l l l f n i l . -\

costs and attorney's fees incurred b) anoLher part} to enlorce the provisions hereof,
whether incurred through formal lawsuit or otherwise." R. at 16-37.
15.

, '"I| Iter pi ii chasii :ig tl ic I *i opei I:y, 1"^ Is. Ste ivai I: n: :iade a i n in ibei of

i m p r o v e m e n t s to the exterior design of the house. These improvement.^ nu hided
installing dark wood si Hitters on the froi it exterior o f the limine, painting the garage door
o a r o f c n n brass, painting the entry in ;,,. .....iK ..i.ios . .-^ i S iiia>, installing or painting
t i i r l n > m r \ 4*1111» .idi' m . n l h i p d \\l dm iu n b r a s s , a d d in1.1 illdi!', l o c k . o i l pot t i c i «>l d'«"

front exterior walls oi the home. R. at -1, 5 7, 03, and 87.
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16.

None of these improvements were approved by the Design Review

Committee before taking place. R. 4, 57, and 65.
17.

{

On October 30, 2007, pursuant to paragraph 4.7 of the CC&Rs, BWHOA

gave Ms. Stewart written notice of her violation of the CC&Rs, and demanded Ms.

.

Stewart bring her property into compliance with the CC&Rs. R. at 5, 57, 61, 65, and
70-71.
18.

Ms. Stewart refused to comply with BWHOA's demand. R. at 5, 57, 65,

and 70-71.
19.

On December 11, 2007, BWHOA filed a complaint against Ms. Stewart

based on her refusal to comply with BWHOA's demands. The complaint sought a
declaratory judgment that the changes Ms. Stewart made to the Property were not
architecturally compatible with the Barton Woods PUD. The complaint also sought an
order enjoining Ms. Stewart from making further improvements to the Property without
first obtaining written approval from the Design Review Committee, and ordering Ms.
Stewart to undo, take down, and otherwise reverse the improvements already made to the
Property. R. at 1-46.
20.

On December 11, 2007, BWHOA also filed a Notice of Recording of Lis

Pendens against the Property in order to give notice to any potential buyers of the pending
lawsuit. R. at 47-51.
21.

On or about January 15, 2008, Ms. Stewart filed an answer to the complaint,

together with an amended counterclaim. R. at 63-70.

10
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22

The lirsl cause of aUion asserted in the amended counterclaim stated, in its

ei itiret> as follows:
L

2.

3.

The {'.(' <Vr i\" in KSUC ' r u n with the subject property"
.iMii iiunc !o the benefit o\ eavh »•• - <• Iheicnf". I he\
are directly enforceable by | Ms. Stewart|.
Insofar as the "exterior of all buildings will be
constructed of brick on the lower part, with the upper
part being wood, stucco and or other material
authorized", all structures containing windows, glass or
metal doors, or exterior material other than brick, wood
or stucco, are in \ solanor
[Ms. Stewart | is entitled to demand that [BWHOA j. by
its Design Review Committee, rectify such violations
forthwith.
Wherefore, jiVl^. Stuwani |>ia\|^j UMI MIC I =.IIL u u e r
its Order forthwith that |BW1 IOA| prompt!} co\er
with bnek. wood, or stucco, all windows and glass or
mclal doors, and other apertures in the exterior of all
strucltii\ ^ in the subdivision HOI P.. ^ covered with
brick, wood or ^liico>. that the Coun award [Ms.
StewartJ her costs and fees in prosecuting the action,
and for such other and further relief as the ( ^urt deems
just in the p'vnHse^,

R. at 67-68.
23.

The amended counterclaim also sought aiI award of at least $250,000.00 in

« - -ee- -*

"A!. *

. ^ j u e e .ippu '••;. : •-instant.ai encroachments upon [the

Proper! ! h- Uiu uvvners oM 1
2A

i«

:'

T neither the original counterclaim

Januan -..:;(-

T
whicl i Ms. Stewart had filed on

,ior the amended counterclaim did M s . Stewart allege a eair< Taction

f< ' »i < vroi igii il 11 : :i i, ii i ij >rop< :i lis pendi ms, < )i tliatB'VV I IO; \ "s coi i if )h in it w as i ib-isjve or
otherwise improper. R. at 59-60, and 67-68.
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25.

On or about March 26, 2008, before any discovery had been conducted by

either party, Ms. Stewart filed the First Motion for Summary Judgment, in which she
argued that BWHOA had either discriminated against her or had abandoned the CC&Rs
and/or the Amended CC&Rs. R. at 76-143.
26.

(

As support for the First Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Stewart

attached numerous photographs of Lot 109 and other residences for which she provided
i

no evidentiary support or foundation. R. at 80, and 87-143.
27.

On or about April 24, 2008, BWHOA filed a cross motion for summary

judgment (the "Cross Motion"). R. at 222-252.
28.

On or about September 12, 2008, Ms. Stewart filed a motion to strike the lis

pendens (the "Motion to Strike Lis Pendens"). R. at 303-310.
29.

On October 17, 2008, the trial court issued a ruling regarding the First

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Cross Motion, and the Motion to Strike Lis Pendens.
R. at 331-343.
30.

Regarding the First Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court held that

the CC&Rs regulate colors, that the Design Review Committee has control over
alterations, and that the trial court did not have authority to override the Design Review
Committee's determinations. Nevertheless, the trial court determined that there were
questions of material fact as to whether BWHOA had abandoned the CC&Rs or
otherwise arbitrarily enforced them. Thus, the trial court denied the First Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. at 336-338.

12
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31.

Because there were questions regarding whetl ;u* or not the C C & R s .had

hn n abandon1 'I "M f I I I * I ( I . I M I V n i l o i r c d IIL i i i i h n i i i i ill n denied (IK r i o s ^ M n i i i i i i
338-339.

32.

'

P it

-:

Finally, the trial court also denied the Motioi l to Strike Lis Pendens,

holding

tl mt tl le i ii idei by ing actioi i coi ild affec t title to tl i.e property because "any rights a
prospective purchaser wen ild acqi lii e woi ild be si lbject to tl lis Coi it t's detern lination" ai id
hj: would be unfair to allow the new owner to purchase the h o m e witliout warning the
n e w owner of the potential actions the new owner wouM be requited to take. , " R at

33.

On December 2, 2008, M s . Stewart initiated banki

filing a petition fi u Chapter

7

.-

» .. .

bankruplcy protection (the "First Bankruptcy

Proceedings ; ^ .u .»4*/- > - .
34.

On I\;eeiiibei I "

MIM}' P \VI 1* ) \ tillkd :i notice ot f Js Nte\\arl\

bankruptcy with the trial coui t. R. at 349-350.
35.

On or about Jar-nary 26, 2009

ai id in spite of f lei bar ik i i iptcy 1 ilii ig

before air- discover) had \et Uiki u place

I\ Is. Stew art filed tl le Secoi id Motioi i foi Si immary

Judgment. R. at J 5 1-359, 3o0-4.Y> ai-.t : "7 - K 3 .
36.

The SectMHI Motion lor Summary Judgmeiit essentially asserted the same

arguments nun ^ \ Mew art h.jd made in the First Motion for Summary Judgment mi

|!

( "C&.R s I lad beei ». abai ic lot iec I ai id ' :)i disci: in lii latoi ily ei lforced. 1 1 le

Second Motion for Summary Ji ldgment relied upoi i the s; t.i ne photogn ipl is th; it I Is
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Stewart had attached to the earlier motion for summary judgment, while attempting to
provide evidentiary foundation for these photographs. R. at 351-358, and 360-413.
37.

*

On March 5, 2009, the bankruptcy court dismissed the First Bankruptcy

Proceedings. R. at 472-475.
38.

But before the state trial court decided the Second Motion for Summary

Judgment, on June 15, 2009 Ms. Stewart filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy
protection (the "Second Bankruptcy Proceedings"). BWHOA filed a notice of
bankruptcy filing on or about July 14, 2009. R. at 659-660.
39.

On July 31, 2009, the trial court issued a ruling denying the Second Motion

for Summary Judgment, holding that "genuine issues of material fact exist as to the issue
of abandonment and discriminatory enforcement of the subdivision's restrictive
covenants. . . ." R. at 675.
40.

The trial court's July 31, 2009 ruling also stayed the proceedings pending

Ms. Stewart's Second Bankruptcy Proceedings. R. at 676.
41.

On August 25, 2009, the trial court signed an order denying the Second

Motion for Summary Judgment and staying the proceedings pending the bankruptcy. R.
at 728-729, and 734-735.
42.

Before the trial court issued the August 25 order, however, on August 10,

2009, Ms. Stewart had filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of the
Second Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion for Reconsideration"). R. at
678-718.

14
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43.

In the Motion for Reconsideration, Ms. Stewart raised for the first time the

argument that "[BWHOA] has waived all claims of violation of any covenant except that
relating to the 'dark' color of [Ms. Stewart's] garage door." R. at 681. Ms. Stewart,
however, provided no factual support for her contention that BWHOA had waived its
claims.
44.

On August 27, 2009, BWHOA filed an opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration, arguing that this motion was not appropriate under Utah law, and that,
given the pending bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart was likely to soon lose standing to pursue her
counterclaims. R. at 737-741. This opposition also notified the trial court that the Motion
for Reconsideration was the first document in which Ms. Stewart had argued that
BWHOA had waived any claims. R. at 740-741.
45.

On November 2, 2009, the trial court denied the Motion for

Reconsideration for the reasons advocated by BWHOA. R. at 757-758.
46.

Stepping back several months, on August 21, 2009, BAC Home Loans

Servicing, L.P., f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., a secured creditor in Ms.
Stewart's Second Bankruptcy Proceedings, filed a proof of claim in those proceedings in
connection with a loan it had made to Ms. Stewart that was secured by Lot 109.
R. at 915-922.
47.

On September 8, 2009, Judge R. Kimball Mosier of the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah signed an Uncontested Order Confirming
Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan. R. at 924-933.
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48.

In paragraph 9 of the bankruptcy court's Order, Judge Mosier states that

Ms. Stewart "hereby surrenders] the collateral [i.e., the Property] to such creditor."
R. at 927.
49.

In accordance with the bankruptcy court's order approving Ms. Stewart's

chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, on March 11, 2010, at 10:30 a.m., the Property was sold at a
non-judicial foreclosure sale by the successor trustee Recontrust Company, N.A. R. at
935-936.
50.

The trustee's deed for the sale reads: "[T]he successor Trustee did, at the

time and place of sale, then and there sell at public auction, to [Federal National
Mortgage Association] above named, being the highest bidder therefor, the property
described for the sum of $445,974.99." R. at 935.
51.

Shortly after the foreclosure sale, the purchaser or one of its successors

under the trustee's deed remedied the alterations to the Property that were the subject of
the proceedings in state court. R. at 904-907, and 909-913.
52.

On December 7, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District

of Utah signed an order lifting the bankruptcy stay and allowing these proceedings to
continue. R. at 764-765.
53.

Returning to the state court proceedings, on December 11, 2009, BWHOA

filed with the trial court a Notice of Order Lifting Bankruptcy Stay and Request for Rule
16 Conference. R. at 760-766.
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54.

On June 11, 2010, the trial court signed a stipulated case management

order. R. at 772-774. This order set July 30, 2010, as the last date upon which motions to
amend the pleadings could be filed. R. at 772-773. July 30, 2010 passed without Ms.
Stewart seeking any leave to amend her counterclaim.
55.

On June 17, 2010, Ms. Stewart mailed her Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures

to BWHOA. R. at 776-778. These disclosures listed two potential witnesses, and
asserted that her claims were worth approximately $500,000.00, together with
approximately $60,000.00 in legal expenses. These disclosures provided no further
information. R. at 776-777.
56.

On August 17, 2010, BWHOA filed a Notice of Release of Lis Pendens.

R. at 826-828.
57.

On August 24, 2010, Ms. Stewart filed the Third Motion for Summary

Judgment. R. at 779-823.
58.

On September 15, 2010, BWHOA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

and counterclaims or in the alternative for summary judgment on all claims. R. at 829831. BWHOA also filed a document titled Combined Memorandum in Support of
Motion: (1) To Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendants' Counterclaims Pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 41; Or, in the Alternative, (2) For Summary Judgment on All Claims and
Counterclaims, and in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment (the "September Motion"). R. at 832-936.
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59.

In the September Motion, BWHOA argued that its own complaint should be

dismissed because the Property had been sold and the objectionable alterations had been
remedied; thus, BWHOA's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. R. at
837-838.
60.

The September Motion also argued that Ms. Stewart's counterclaims should

be dismissed. Even at this late date, Ms. Stewart had never amended her pleadings to
assert a claim of wrongful lien, wrongful lis pendens, or abusive litigation. Thus, because
Ms. Stewart's causes of action arose from the CC&Rs, the benefits of which run with the
land and inure to the benefit of the land's owner, BWHOA argued that, given the
surrender and subsequent sale of the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart no longer had
standing to pursue her counterclaims. R. at 839-841.
61.

On December 2, 2010, at oral argument Ms. Stewart's counsel admitted that

Ms. Stewart could no longer seek injunctive relief based upon the CC&Rs or damages for
encroachment. The transcript of the argument reads as follows:
MR. SMAY [i.e., Ms. Stewart's counsel]: Well, I think there
are, in fact, two matters of importance here. I think it is true
that insofar as Ms. Stewart no longer owns the property, a
claim respecting trespass to her property allowed by the
Homeowners Association will have passed to the new owner
of the property. I think that's true, but the fact of the matter
isTHE COURT: This is the encroachment issue.
MR. SMAY: The encroachment issue.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. SMAY: Yes.
THE COURT: So she no longer has that to claim.
MR. SMA Y: I don yt think she has that claim any longer.
That will pass.
18
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THE COURT: Which I understand to be the second cause
of action in your counterclaim.
MR. SMA Y: Yes, Your Honor
THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. Let me ask you a
question with respect to the first cause of action in your
counterclaim, Mr. Smay, that would be helpful to the Court.
Is there any question, in your mind, that that has been mooted
by the fact - forget the bankruptcy - that she doesn't own the
property anymore? That was the claim where, basically, your
client was seeking to enforce or to require the Homeowners
Association to enforce the CC&R's against all of the other
property owners. Kind of tongue-in-cheek it almost seemed
to me MR. SMAY: Right. She is no THE COURT: - and if you're going to enforce this against
me, then I'm going to require you to enforce it against
everybody.
MR. SMAY: Correct.
THE COURT: Is that not also gone with respect to this?
MR. SMA Y: I think thaVs true. She is no longer interested
in having those enforced.
R. at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 15 line 14 through page
16 line 7, and page 17 line 10 through page 18 line 5) (emphasis added).
62.

At the December 2, 2010 oral argument, the trial court ruled from the

bench, granting the relief sought in the September Motion, dismissing BWHOA's
complaint and Ms. Stewart's counterclaim, and denying an award of attorney's fees and
costs to Ms. Stewart. R. at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 29
line 18 through page 36 line 8).
63.

Specifically, the trial court stated:
[F]rom what I've heard here from counsel and for yourself,
Mr. Smay, is that there really is no disagreement, but what -
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the counterclaim should be dismissed, and the Court is,
therefore, going to dismiss that counterclaim.
With respect to [BWHOA's] claim, I think you find
yourself in an interesting position where what you are wanting
to do, basically, is have the Court give what would, at this
point, because it's otherwise mooted, be an advisory opinion
so that it would substantiate an award of attorneys fees and
costs. Let me tell you and give you the benefit, at least, [of]
the Court's thinking on that, and then I'll turn to your motion
in just a minute. Even though I think your motion is moot at
this point, I want to deal with it at least somewhat
substantively here.
We've got a situation where [Ms. Stewart] in this case
no longer owns the property. How she got there, I think, for
purposes of what we're dealing with right here, doesn't
matter. She doesn't own the property anymore. As a result, I
think we're in a situation where this issue of whether the
Homeowners acted properly or not has become mooted,
which moots [BWHOA's] complaint.
[BWHOA] in this case is asking to dismiss its own complaint,
as well as [Ms. Stewart's] counterclaim, which is being
dismissed based on a stipulation from counsel for [Ms.
Stewart], and rightfully so. I think that's appropriate, and the
Court is going to decline to keep [BWHOA's] complaint alive
for the purpose, simply, of determining whether what
[BWHOA] did in this case, initially, in terms of enforcing the
CC&R's and defining this lawsuit is concerned. I don't think
the Court has anything further that's justiciable before it that
the Court can deal with to be able to make that kind of a
ruling.
I will give you the benefit of at least this Court's
feelings with respect, also, Mr. Smay, to the issue of attorneys
fees. I don't read the attorney fee provision that is in the
CC&R's as broadly as I think you do. I read that provision to
say that there are fees awardable in the event there is a default
by any party to those, and I do think the parties to those would
include the owner of the property, as well as the
Homeowner's Association, and any provision of the CC&R's
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that you have to enforce because of the default of somebody
else.
Candidly, it appeared to me, from reviewing the file,
that there was not that issue that ever really got litigated
before the Court up to this point in the case. I don't think that
it's a provision that just gives fees to the prevailing or nonprevailing party. I think you have to be trying to enforce the
CC&R's.
Candidly, you had a cause of action in the first cause of
action that sought to do that, but I think that it was, as we
talked about a little bit earlier, a little bit tongue-in-cheek, it's
if you're going to enforce it against me, then you better
enforce it against everybody, and that was a point to make,
and I suspect the point wasn't missed on Judge Memmott It
isn't missed on me, and it probably isn't missed on
[BWHOA's] counsel or the Homeowners Association either.
Don't do it indiscriminately.

I don't think the attorney fee provision is that broad, as
I indicated. I told you how I read that, but also, I don't think
that [Ms. Stewart] in this case is the prevailing party. On the
only substantive portion of Judge Memmott's rulings to this
point, the issue was - aside from finding factual issues and
denying the motions, I don't mean to say that that's not
substantive. It is, but in terms of actually making a ruling,
that ruling was actually not in favor of [Ms. Stewart]. It was
in favor of [B WHOA] in terms of the enforcement.
So I don't think there's any attorneys fees and costs
actually to be awarded in this case, irrespective, based on the
history of what's occurred, and I don't believe I can keep this
case alive by forcing [BWHOA], who wants to dismiss its
complaint, to keep that complaint in effect in this case so that
we can get an advisory opinion from the Court as to whether,
ultimately, the Homeowners Association properly or
improperly tried to enforce its CC&R's as against [Ms.
Stewart] here.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
21 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I think that's the posture that we're in no matter how
unfortunate. I'm certainly sorry for [Ms. Stewart's] loss in
terms of the loss of the property. I don't know what is the
base of that or what caused that. There can be all kinds of
factors, but none of that, at least, is plead in this particular
action. None of that is a part of the allegations in this action.
There's no claim for that in this action, and the Court in this
case simply can't deal with that.
R. at 981 (transcript at page 29 line 22 through page 34 line 11).
64.

On December 20, 2010, the trial court signed a written order dismissing the

complaint and counterclaims with prejudice, while ordering the parties to bear their own
attorney's fees and costs. R. at 968-970. The trial court filed this judgment on
December 22, 2010.
65.

On January 11, 2011, Ms. Stewart filed her Notice of Appeal, which stated

that she "appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of Honorable Robert Dale
entered in this matter December 22, 2010. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment."
R. at 971.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court dismissed the complaint because it was moot, and the counterclaims
because Ms. Stewart lacked standing. The cojrrectness of these decisions, and not the trial
court's prior rulings regarding the meaning of the CC&Rs, is the only issue properly
before the Court.
The trial court correctly dismissed BWHOA's complaint because, by surrendering
the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart mooted the conflict between herself and
BWHOA. The trial court also correctly dismissed Ms. Stewart's counterclaims because,
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by surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, and based upon admissions by her counsel,
Ms. Stewart lacked standing to pursue her asserted counterclaims.
Because the dismissals do not establish any culpability, there was no "prevailing
party," and the trial court's decision not to award attorneys' fees was correct.
Furthermore, Ms. Stewart has abandoned and/or waived any claims that would have
justified an attorneys' fees claim under the CC&Rs.
Ms. Stewart's brief, in addition to focusing on issues not properly before the Court,
also makes spurious arguments regarding her right to pursue claims for wrongful lien
and/or abusive litigation. Ms. Stewart has no right to pursue such claims, however,
because she has never plead such claims, and the time to amend her pleadings is long
past.
Even if the issues stated by Ms. Stewart on appeal are properly before the Court,
her arguments fail. The CC&Rs contain express restrictions that Ms. Stewart voluntarily
accepted. When read in their entirety, the CC&Rs gave BWHOA the authority to require
Ms. Stewart to rectify the objectionable alterations she had made to the Property. And
contrary to Ms. Stewart's unfounded assertion, BWHOA never waived its right to require
Ms. Stewart to rectify any of those alterations.
ARGUMENT
Ms. Stewart's brief looks beyond the mark. Instead of focusing and attacking the
actual basis for the trial court's decision, she looks into the past and attempts to appeal
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earlier decisions by the trial court. She further muddies the water by arguing claims that
were never plead and facts that have never been established.
The bases of the trial court's December 22, 2010 order dismissing the complaint
and counterclaims - which is the only judgment that Ms. Stewart has appealed and is the
only judgment that she can attack - are: (1) BWHOA's complaint cannot continue
because by surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart mooted the conflict
between herself and BWHOA; and (2) by surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, and
based upon admissions by her counsel, Ms. Stewart lacked standing to pursue her asserted
counterclaims. The trial court's decision on these points was correct and should be
upheld.
I.

MS. STEWART CANNOT USE HER APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECEMBER 22, 2010, ORDER TO ATTACK EARLIER NON-FINAL
DECISIONS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT.
A notice of appeal filed under Rule 4, Utah R. App. P., serves to "advise the

opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular
case." Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964) (emphasis added).
An appellant must limit its appellate arguments to attacks upon the specific judgment
identified in the notice. Id. The "[respondent is entitled to know specifically which
judgment is being appealed." Id. (Emphasis added).
On January 11, 2010, Ms. Stewart filed a Notice of Appeal regarding "the final
judgment of Honorable Robert Dale entered in this matter December 22, 2010." The
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notice of appeal does not reference any other judgments or decisions. Thus, Ms. Stewart
must limit her appeal to attacks upon the specific December 22 judgment.
She does not do so. Instead, she focuses the bulk of her appeal on arguments she
raised in the First Motion for Summary Judgment, the Second Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, which played no role in the trial court's
decision to dismiss the complaint and counterclaims.1
Ms. Stewart's statement of facts further illustrates her failure to limit her appeal to
the December 22, 2010 judgment. In paragraphs 6 through 8 of her statement of facts,
Ms. Stewart identifies holdings from trial court decisions dated October 2008 and July
2009. Those holdings, however, were irrelevant to the court's ultimate decision to
dismiss the litigation for mootness and lack of standing.
BWHOA was put on notice that the specific December 22, 2010, judgment was
being appealed. Ms. Stewart's brief, however, attempts to broaden the scope of her
appeal to encompass earlier decisions. She should not be allowed to do so. Instead, the
Court should look at the rationale for the trial court's December 22, 2010 judgment and
determine its correctness.

1

Ms. Stewart's fourth issue statement, while citing her response to the September
Motion - i.e., the motion that ultimately resulted in the litigation's dismissal - is fatally
flawed for several reasons that will be discussed in depth below. First, there is no
evidence in the record that the litigation drove Ms. Stewart into bankruptcy. And second,
Ms. Stewart cannot argue that the litigation and/or the lis pendens were wrongful or
abusive because she has never asserted those claims against BWHOA.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BWHOA'S COMPLAINT
BECAUSE NO CONTROVERSY EXISTS AND BWHOA'S COMPLAINT
IS MOOT.
Utah has a "strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions [that] dictates

that courts refrain from adjudicating moot questions." Merhish v. K A. Folson &
Associates, 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982), citing State v. Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171 (Utah
1981), andHoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980). Thus, "[i]f the requested judicial
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally
refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (1981);
Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981). "Once a controversy has become moot,
a trial court should enter an order of dismissal." Merhish, 646 P.2d at 732 (emphasis
added).
Because the alterations to the Property were remedied after the foreclosure sale, a
controversy no longer existed between BWHOA and Ms. Stewart. BWHOA's complaint
had sought a declaration that "the CC&Rs prevent [Ms. Stewart] from making the
referenced improvements to [the Property] without obtaining prior written approval from
the Design Review Committee, that the improvements made to [the Property] are not
'architecturally compatible' with the subdivision, and that the improvements to [the
Property] do not establish and preserve a harmonious design for the subdivision." Record
at 5, Tj 27. BWHOA had also sought an injunction preventing Ms. Stewart "from making
further improvements to [the Property] without first obtaining written approval from the
Design Review Committee, and ordering [Ms. Stewart] to undo, take down, and

26
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otherwise reverse the improvements made to [the Property] alleged herein" Record
at 6, f 33 (emphasis added).
BWHOA described the particular improvements at issue in paragraph 19 of the
complaint. They included "installing dark wood shutters on the front exterior of the
home, painting the garage door dark brown/brass, painting the entry to the home a dark
brown/brass, installing or painting the home's curbside mailbox a dark brown/brass, and
installing rocks on portions of the front exterior walls of the home." Record at 4, ^ 19.
The alterations to the Property were photographed around the time this case was
commenced. Record at 904-907. These changes to the Property, and the fact they were
made by Ms. Stewart without obtaining prior approval from BWHOA's Design Review
Committee, were admitted by Ms. Stewart in her Answer and Amended Counterclaim.
Record at 65, H 19-20.
More recent photographs of the Property show that the objectionable alterations
have been remedied. The wood shutters have been removed, the garage door has been
repainted a lighter color, the entryway has been renovated to a lighter wood color, the
mailbox is now white, and the exterior stonework has been removed. Record at 904-905
& 909-913. Thus, BWHOA realized that the factual basis for the requested declaratory
and injunctive relief no longer existed, and it requested that the complaint be dismissed.
Furthermore, because Ms. Stewart no longer owns the Property, any injunction
requiring her to comply with the relevant CC&Rs would have been of no effect. If
BWHOA had continued the lawsuit, any relief it ultimately received would not have
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affected the rights of either party: BWHOA would not have been able to receive more
than it had already received, and any order requiring Ms. Stewart to do anything regarding
the Property would have been toothless. Thus, the controversy regarding BWHOA's
complaint was moot, and the trial court correctly dismissed BWHOA5s complaint.2

HI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MS. STEWART'S
COUNTERCLAIMS BECAUSE SHE NO LONGER HAS ANY INTEREST
IN THE PROPERTY AND SHE HAS ADMITTED THAT SHE CAN NO
LONGER ASSERT THEM.
The trial court dismissed Ms. Stewart's counterclaims because she lacked standing.
Standing is a prerequisite to invoking a court's subject matter jurisdiction. Brown v. Div.
of Water Rights ofDept of Natural Res., 228 P.3d 747, 750 (Utah 2010). As such, it can
be raised as a defense at any time. Id. at 751. To establish standing, the party invoking
the court's jurisdiction must establish three things: (1) injury; (2) causation; and (3)

2

Given Utah's strong policy against advisory opinions, this Court should not
address Ms. Stewart's arguments regarding the meaning or interpretation of the CC&Rs,
or the alleged history of inconsistent enforcement of the CC&Rs. Because Ms. Stewart
no longer owns the Property, she no longer has the right to invoke or seek to enforce the
CC&Rs. Conditions, covenants and restrictions that run with the land "form a contract
between subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore,
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of construction as those used
to interpret contracts." See Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 2000). "One
of the most basic principles of contract law is that, as a general rule, only parties to the
contract may enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract." Wagner v.
Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 442 (Utah 2002).
Because Ms. Stewart surrendered the Property, she is no longer a party to the
CC&Rs and, therefore, cannot sue to enforce them. Thus, there is not, and cannot be, any
conflict between BWHOA and Ms. Stewart regarding the CC&Rs. In the absence of a
conflict, any decision by this Court regarding the CC&Rs would necessarily be advisory
in nature.
28
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redressability. Id. at 752. These elements are indispensable and it is the responsibility of
the party invoking the court's jurisdiction to ensure that these elements exist at all stages
of the litigation. Id. at 751, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992).
Ms. Stewart cannot satisfy these elements. Ms. Stewart's alleged injuries were
dependent upon her ownership of the Property. By surrendering the Property, she cannot
claim that her interests face any injury. Because she has surrendered the Property, and
given the nature of her asserted counterclaims, any remedy that the trial court might have
fashioned would not have given any redress to Ms. Stewart. And Ms. Stewart's counsel
has admitted that Ms. Stewart lacks standing to pursue her counterclaims.
A.

Ms. Stewart lost her ability to maintain her counterclaims when she
surrendered the Property in bankruptcy.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C), a debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy may
surrender property securing a claim to that creditor. Such surrender contemplates "a
return of property and a relinquishing of possession or control to the holder of the claim."
In re Stone, 166 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993). See also In Re Robertson, 72
B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) ("Thus, it would clearly appear that Congress
contemplated the term to mean the return and relinquishing of possession or control to the
holder of a claim. This is consistent with the definition provided in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, dated 1966. That definition sets forth that the term 'surrender'
means 'to give up to the holder in remainder or reversion; to relinquish to the grantor; to
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deliver into lawful custody . . . to give or deliver up possession of upon compulsion or
demand.'").
Ms. Stewart gave up possession and control of the Property to her mortgage lender
when she surrendered the Property in bankruptcy. Record at 927. The lender
subsequently sold the Property at a trustee's sale. Record at 935-936.
Accordingly, Ms. Stewart can no longer maintain her counterclaims. In her
Answer and Amended Counterclaim, Ms. Stewart admitted that the basis of her first
cause of action is the CC&Rs, which '"run with the subject property' and c inure to the
benefit of each owner thereof.'" Record at 67, ^f 1. Because the right to seek injunctive
relief runs with the land and is contingent upon ownership of the Property, Ms. Stewart
does not have standing to assert her counterclaim for injunctive relief.
By surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart no longer has standing to
pursue a claim for encroachment as a simple matter of contract law. Conditions,
covenants and restrictions that run with the land "form a contract between subdivision
property owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, interpretation of the
covenants is governed by the same rules of construction as those used to interpret
contracts." See Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 2000). "One of the most
basic principles of contract law is that, as a general rule, only parties to the contract may
enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d
440, 442 (Utah 2002). Thus, when considering which party can enforce a restrictive
covenant the Utah Supreme Court has held that a covenant that runs with the land
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"bestows a benefit or imposes a burden only on the rights of a landholder, as
landholder:' Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah
1989) (emphasis added).3
Ms. Stewart is no longer in any legal position to invoke rights granted by the
CC&Rs. The right to sue to enforce rights arising from the CC&Rs is a right that runs
with the land and only inures to the benefit of property owners in the Barton Woods PUD.
Ms. Stewart is no longer a party to the CC&Rs and she cannot sue for any alleged
violations of that contract.
The CC&Rs make clear that only current property owners have the right to sue for
violations of the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs prefatory language states the CC&Rs are "for the
purposes of protecting the value and desirability of the subject property and . . . shall run
with the subject property and be binding on all parties having any rights, title or interest
in that subject property or any part thereof. . . and shall inure to the benefit of each
owner thereof" Record, at 5. By the very terms of the document she argues BWHOA
violated, Ms. Stewart no longer has legal standing to pursue any cause of action against
BWHOA for damages resulting from alleged encroachment by a neighbor.

3

The Utah Supreme Court's holding comports with the positions taken in sister
states. For instance, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated as follows: "The
Supreme Court has said that the right to sue and enforce restrictive covenants against any
other lot owner taking with record notice 'rests upon the principle that a negative
easement of this sort is a property right amounting to an interest in land."' Taylor v.
Kenton, 413 S.E.2d 576, 579-80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), quoting Craven County v. First
Citizens Bank and Trust, 75 S.E.2d 620, 628 (1953).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
31 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

B.

Ms. Stewart's counsel has admitted that Ms. Stewart cannot maintain her
counterclaims.

During the December 2, 2010 oral argument regarding the Third Motion for
Summary Judgment and the September Motion, Ms. Stewart's counsel, Craig Smay,
stated that Ms. Stewart no longer had the right to sue BWHOA for encroachment, and he
agreed with the trial court that, by virtue of surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, Ms.
Stewart no longer had the right to seek enforcement of the CC&Rs. In short, Mr. Smay
admitted that Ms. Stewart no longer had standing to pursue her only two counterclaims.
Admissions by a party opponent are, at the very least, highly probative of contested
legal issues. For instance, "[w]hen an admission is treated as a matter of pleading . . . the
admission is necessarily conclusive as to the facts admitted," and "precludes the pleader
from denying obligations implied by law from such admitted facts." Garland v.
Fleischman, 831 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah 1992). See also Toone v. P. J. O'Neill Construction
Co., 121 P. 10, 13 (Utah 1912) ("If the defendant admits any fact or facts in its answer, it
thereby waives proof of all facts thus admitted, and the issue to which such admissions
relate must be determined in accordance with such admissions."). Thus, Mr. Smay's
admissions, although not provided in the pleading context, should be given great weight
in determining whether Ms. Stewart has standing to pursue her alleged counterclaims.
Mr. Smay's admissions are compelling evidence that Ms. Stewart has waived her
right to pursue her asserted counterclaims. "To establish waiver, a defendant must show
that the plaintiff had (1) an existing right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) an intent
to relinquish the right." IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D &KMgmt.} Inc., 196 P.3d 588,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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594 (Utah 2008). Mr. Smay's colloquy with Judge Dale shows that Mr. Smay clearly
knew the existence and nature of his client's counterclaim rights - indeed, Mr. Smay had
drafted the counterclaims - and that Ms. Stewart no longer intended to pursue those
claims. R. at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 15 line 14
through page 16 line 7, and page 17 line 10 through page 18 line 5). Thus, because Ms.
Stewart is bound by the actions of her attorney when he is acting within the scope of his
authority (see Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)), during the
December 2, 2010, oral argument Ms. Stewart waived her right to pursue all of her
asserted counterclaims.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES TO MS. STEWART BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A PREVAILING
PARTY AND THE CC&RS DID NOT ALLOW AN AWARD.
"As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and

only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract." Gilbert Dev. Corp. v.
Wardley Corp., 246 P.3d 131, 146 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), quoting Doctors' Co. v. Drezga,
218 P.3d 598, \ 32 (Utah 2009). The trial court denied an award of attorneys' fees and
costs to Ms. Stewart because she was not a prevailing party.
At its heart, the question of whether or not a party prevails is a question of who the
court determines culpable. "It is the determination of culpability . . . that determines who
is the prevailing party." Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, u[w]hile a reduction in the amount claimed by a plaintiff may seem a moral and
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financial victory for a defendant, it does not make the defendant the 'prevailing party' in
terms of attorney fees." Id.
Although Brown involved legal as opposed to equitable claims, there is no reason
why the rationale should not apply in the present case. Although Ms. Stewart has avoided
the effects of B WHOA's complaint, such avoidance is the result of her sale of the
Property and not a judicial determination of culpability. Thus, even though Ms. Stewart
may have the moral victory of avoiding a judgment, she is not the prevailing party.
The trial court recognized as much during the December 2, 2010 oral argument
when Judge Dale stated:
I don't think that [Ms. Stewart] in this case is the prevailing
party. On the only substantive portion of Judge Memmott's
rulings to this point, the issue was - aside from finding factual
issues and denying the motions, I don't mean to say that that's
not substantive. It is, but in terms of actually making a ruling,
that ruling was actually not in favor of [Ms. Stewart]. It was
in favor of [BWHOA] in terms of the enforcement.
Furthermore, the CC&Rs do not allow an award of attorneys fees to Ms. Stewart in
connection with her counterclaims. The CC&R section allowing attorney fees states:
"If any party governed by the terms of this Declaration defaults under any provision
hereof, that defaulting party shall pay all costs and attorney's fees incurred by another
party to enforce the provisions hereof, whether incurred through formal lawsuit or
otherwise."
Thus, the party seeking to recover fees must first be seeking to enforce the
CC&Rs. As explained above, Ms. Stewart has no standing to assert her counterclaim to
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enforce the CC&Rs and/or has waived that claim. The trial court explained the situation
as follows:
I will give you the benefit of at least this Court's feelings with
respect, also, Mr. Smay, to the issue of attorneys fees. I don't
read the attorney fee provision that is in the CC&R's as
broadly as I think you do. I read that provision to say that
there are fees awardable in the event there is a default by any
party to those, and I do think the parties to those would
include the owner of the property, as well as the
Homeowner's Association, and any provision of the CC&R's
that you have to enforce because of the default of somebody
else.
Candidly, it appeared to me, from reviewing the file,
that there was not that issue that ever really got litigated
before the Court up to this point in the case. I don't think that
it's a provision that just gives fees to the prevailing or nonprevailing party. I think you have to be trying to enforce the
CC&R's.
Candidly, you had a cause of action in the first cause of
action that sought to do that, but I think that it was, as we
talked about a little bit earlier, a little bit tongue-in-cheek, it's
if you're going to enforce it against me, then you better
enforce it against everybody, and that was a point to make,
and I suspect the point wasn't missed on Judge Memmott. It
isn't missed on me, and it probably isn't missed on
[BWHOA's] counsel or the Homeowners Association either.
Don't do it indiscriminately.
As Mr. Smay admitted, Ms. Stewart has no cognizable claim to enforce the
CC&Rs. Thus, the trial court's decision regarding attorneys' fees and costs can hardly be
said to be patent error or clear abuse of discretion.
And Ms. Stewart cannot point to any other bases for asserting a right to attorneys'
fees and costs. Despite her contentions otherwise Ms. Stewart has never asserted any
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claims for wrongful lien and/or abusive litigation. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely,
given that such claims are not directed at enforcing the CC&RS, that any such claims
would fall within the limited confines in which the CC&Rs allow an award of attorneys'
fees and costs.
Thus, the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees and costs was not patent error or a
clear abuse of discretion and should stand.
V.

MS. STEWART HAS NEVER ASSERTED CLAIMS FOR ABUSIVE
LITIGATION AND/OR WRONGFUL LIEN; THUS, THESE ISSUES ARE
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Ms. Stewart has never amended her counterclaims to include claims for abusive

litigation and/or improper lien. Her January 15, 2008 amended counterclaim - which is
her most recent pleading - seeks to enforce the CC&Rs and to recover damages for
alleged encroachments upon her property. Nowhere in this pleading does she state any
facts from which any reasonable person could deduce that she intended to sue for abusive
litigation and or improper lien. And the deadline for amending her pleadings to include
such causes of action - July 30, 2010 - is long past. Thus, any arguments regarding those
issues are not properly before the Court.
Even though Utah only requires notice pleading, a party's pleadings must still give
adequate notice of claims to be asserted. As clarified by this Court:
Although "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation involved/ "
[Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, ^ 14, 122 P.3d 622]
(quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971
(Utah 1982)), it must do at least that much, see Harper v.
36
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Evans, 2008 UT App 165, f 13, 185 P.3d 573 ("[T]he
[plaintiffs'] amended complaint alleges only that [the
defendants negligently performed the November 2002
surgeries and nothing more. These allegations, standing alone,
do not state a claim for relief for continuous negligent
treatment, even under Utah's liberal notice pleading
requirements." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 193 P.3d 650, 657-58 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
When a pleading fails to at least give fair notice of claims, courts may not consider
any such claims. Id. at 658. And a party cannot amend its pleading "by raising novel
claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment, Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.1989);
McDowell v. Sullivan, 132 F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D.I11.1990), because such amendment fails
to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7, 8, 9, 10." Holmes Dev.f
LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 904 (Utah 2002).
That is precisely what Ms. Stewart has attempted to do. In opposition to the
September Motion, Ms. Stewart argues that she needs to be allowed to pursue additional
causes of action that she has never plead. But she is bound by her pleadings.
In Cook, the Utah Supreme Court refused to hear a cause of action not asserted in
the complaint. According to that court, "because [plaintiff] failed to raise a breach of
contract action in its complaint against [defendant] that was not predicated either upon
third-party beneficiary liability or upon the title insurance policy, any claim that
[defendant] assumed and breached additional contractual duties to [plaintiff] was
waived." Id.
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For the same reason, Ms. Stewart waived any claims not asserted in her
January 15, 2008 pleading. Accordingly, any arguments on appeal regarding abusive
litigation and/or wrongful lien are not properly before the Court and should not be
considered.
VI.

BWHOA HAS NEVER ABANDONED OR WAIVED ANY CLAIMS
AGAINST MS. STEWART.
Before addressing BWHOA's authority to seek enforcement of the CC&Rs

through litigation, BWHOA must disabuse the Court of one of Ms. Stewart's unsupported
and unsupportable claims: BWHOA never waived all of its claims against Ms. Stewart
except for a claim regarding garage color.
As support for this assertion, Ms. Stewart refers to the 57-paragraph Declaration of
Keith Jones, a member of BWHOA. But Ms. Stewart does not specify in which
paragraph BWHOA allegedly made this waiver. A full reading of the declaration reveals
no such waiver. The purpose of the declaration was to show the numerous violations that
existed on the Property in comparison to the other houses in the subdivision. For
instance, in paragraph 13 of the declaration, Mr. Jones states that the Property
has a dark brown garage door, dark exterior shutters, dark
stone or rock above the front entrance and the garage, and a
brown mailbox. The dark stone above the garage door and
front entrance is completely different from the brick that
covers the other portions of the home's exteriors. There are
no properties in the BWHOA that have these features. From
my standpoint as a member of the [Design Review
Committee], this property violates the CC&Rs because of
these features, and because the owner never obtained approval
from the DRC prior to making these changes to the property.
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R. at 622.
This language, especially in the context of the entire declaration, can hardly be said
to even hint at a distinct and intentional waiver by BWHOA of a known right. See
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)
(establishing standard for proving waiver of a legal right). Rather, it is clear that the
declaration was intended to catalog all of Ms. Stewart's violations.
In short, BWHOA never waived or otherwise abandoned any claims against Ms.
Stewart.
VII.

BWHOA HAD AUTHORITY TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST MS.
STEWART FOR NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF THE CC&RS.
When a party voluntarily purchases land that is subject to recorded covenants, that

party is generally unable to avoid the effect of those covenants. According to the Utah
Supreme Court, "recorded restrictive covenants are enforceable against property owners
who purchased land 'subject to' those covenants." Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc.,
976 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1999). This Court has even noted that "[a]s a general
proposition, property owners who have purchased land in a subdivision, subject to a
recorded set of restrictive covenants and conditions, have the right to enforce such
restrictions through equitable relief against property owners who do not comply with the
stated restrictions." Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). BWHOA,
as the homeowners association, enjoys the same right.
The specific rights that BWHOA has the authority to enforce through litigation is
determined by the CC&Rs, as interpreted by principles of contract law. S. Ridge
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Homeowners'Ass'n v. Brown, 226 P.3d 758, 759 (Utah Ct. App. 2010).4 Paragraph 5.3
of the CC&Rs states that "[a]ll buildings, alterations, improvements, additions and
maintenance on the Subject Property shall be made in a workmanlike manner and shall be
architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project." R. at 20-21. Furthermore, the
CC&Rs state that the purpose of the Design Review Committee is to "create, maintain
and improve Barton Woods Planned Unit Development as a pleasant and desirable
environment, to establish and preserve a harmonious design for the community and to
protect and promote the value of the Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes
or alterations to the existing use of the Property." R. at 40 (emphasis added). To this end,
the CC&Rs require "prior written approval" from the Management Committee of the
Association [aka the Design Review Committee] before any improvements are
constructed, and, moreover, the Design Review Committee has the power to "reject any
home and landscape plans it deems do not comply with the provisions of this
Declaration." R. at 41.

4

Ms. Stewart muddies the water by misplaced reliance upon St. Benedict's Dev.
Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991). St Benedict's focused on
whether or not the court could imply a restrictive covenant in the absence of an express
covenant. In contrast, the present case involves express recorded covenants. Although
Ms. Stewart may not agree with the trial court's interpretation of the word "alterations" or
the court's understanding of what constitutes an "architectural" change, these terms are
used in express grants of power to BWHOA and its Design Review Committee. Thus,
there is no argument that BWHOA is acting under an unwritten implied power; there is a
disagreement as to the boundaries of BWHOA's express powers. Accordingly, Ms.
Stewart's invocation of St Benedict's requirements of "plain and unmistakable" support
or necessity as a matter of law are inapposite, the better guide being the general principle
that express recorded covenants are generally enforceable in equity.
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Ms. Stewart argues that the CC&Rs are not clear because, according to an
unnaturally crimped reading, Section 5.3 only gives power to BWHOA over alterations
that affect use and/or function. But Section 5.3 must be read together with the provision
requiring a harmonious design within the development. Section 5.3 must also be read in
connection with the provision that requires prior written approval from the Design
Review Committee before any improvements are attempted, so that the proper checks and
balances can be invoked to ensure the harmonious design with the rest of the
development.
Furthermore, by its own terms Section 5.3 is not limited to BWHOA's power over
alterations that only affect use or function. Section 5.3 contains no such express
limitations. Indeed, Section 5.3's language is very broad. It grants the BWHOA and its
Design Review Committee power to ensure that all "alterations, improvements, [and]
additions" are "architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project." These powers are
in addition to BWHOA's authority over "buildings." Thus, by including power over
alterations, improvements and additions over and above the power to control buildings,
the BWHOA's power necessarily includes power over decisions not merely related to use
and function.
Furthermore, Ms. Stewart's argument is ultimately untenable. Her argument
ignores a dispositive fact in this case, which is that the CC&R's required Ms. Stewart to
obtain the approval of the Design Review Committee before making improvements to her
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home. It is undisputed that Ms. Stewart's improvements were accomplished without
obtaining the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.
The foregoing restrictions, including the requirement that Ms. Stewart first apply
to the Design Review Committee, serve the underlying purpose of the CC&Rs. The
CC&Rs, and the Designed Review Committee, are intended "to create, maintain and
improve Barton Woods Planned Unit Development as a pleasant and desirable
environment, to establish and preserve a harmonious design for the community and to
protect and promote the value of the Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes
or alterations to the existing use of the Property." R. at 40. Controlling color and
materials ensures harmony in the exterior design, landscaping, changes or alterations.
This harmony protects property values and the desired character of the neighborhood.
Thus, these restrictions are neither arbitrary nor capricious, and BWHOA may seek their
enforcement.
VIII. CONCLUSION.
Ms. Stewart bought a house in a subdivision governed by clear, enforceable,
recorded restrictive covenants. She then made significant changes to the Property that
violated the covenants. She refused to fix the alterations when asked to do so. After her
refusals, BWHOA sought equitable relief to force her to obey her contractual obligations.
Again, instead of doing what she was obligated to do, she sued BWHOA, but failed to
conduct any discovery to support her claims. Furthermore, she never amended her claims
to include causes of action for improper lien or wrongful litigation. She did, however,
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file for bankruptcy, during which she surrendered the Property. The subsequent owner of
the Property fixed all of the problems, and BWHOA realized that any continued lawsuit
against Ms. Stewart would result in it receiving nothing more than it had already received.
Ms. Stewart's attorney also realized that, because of her bankruptcy, the basis for her
claims against BWHOA no longer existed and admitted that all of the claims she had
actually asserted were waived. Thus, the trial court did all it could do - it dismissed the
entire case and ordered the parties to bear their own costs.
Thus, for these reasons, and for all the reasons set forth in detail above, the trial
court's decision was proper and should be upheld.
DATED this J

day of August, 2011.
WOOD JENKINS LLC

Richard J. Armstrong
Brinton M. Wilkins
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff
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Addendum A
Utah R. App. P. 4
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of 4he trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of
an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry of the
order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only
from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in
Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or
order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but
before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than
30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A
motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be
given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate the
thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such reinstatement shall file a
written motion in the Digitized
sentencing
court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30
days after service of the motion to file a written response. If the prosecutor opposes the
motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may present evidence. If the trial
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has demonstrated that he
was deprived of his right to appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The
defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after
the date of entry of the order.
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it
is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely
filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in
the manner provided in this paragraph (g), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs
from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal.
Advisory Committee Note:
Subsection (f) was adopted to implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning
v. State, 2005 UT61, 122 P.3d 628.
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§ 1325. Confirmation of plan, 11 USCA § 1325

United States Code Annotated
Title li. Bankruptcy (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 13. Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. The Plan
11 U.S.C.A. § 1325
§ 1325. Confirmation of plan
Effective: December 22, 2010
Currentness
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if~
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the plan, to be paid before
confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each
allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan—
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that—
(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the earlier of—
(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy law; or
(bb) discharge under section 1328; and
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted without completion of the plan, such lien shall
also be retained by such holder to the extent recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of
such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; and
(iii)if-(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form of periodic payments, such payments
shall be in equal monthly amounts; and
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§ 1325. Confirmation of plan, 11 USCA § 1325

(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount of such payments shall not be
less than an amount sufficient to provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period
of the plan; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder;
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan;
(7) the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good faith;
(8) the debtor has paid all amounts that are required to be paid under a domestic support obligation and that first
become payable after the date of the filing of the petition if the debtor is required by a judicial or administrative
order, or by statute, to pay such domestic support obligation; and
(9) the debtor has filed all applicable Federal, State, and local tax returns as required by section 1308.
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has
a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within
the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor
vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that
debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the
court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan—
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the applicable
commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make
payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "disposable income" means current monthly income received by
the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent child
made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for
such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—
(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a domestic support
obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed; and
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3))
to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to
exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, and operation of such business.
(3) Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2), other than subparagraph (A)(ii) of
paragraph (2), shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor
has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than—
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State for
1 earner;
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(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the
applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the
applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $625 per month for each individual in excess of 4.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the "applicable commitment period"-(A) subject to subparagraph (B), shall be—
(i) 3 years; or
(ii) not less than 5 years, if the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, when
multiplied by 12, is not less than—
(I) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State
for 1 earner;
(II) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income of
the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or
(III) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family income
of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $625 per month for each individual
in excess of 4; and
(B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable under subparagraph (A), but only if the plan provides
for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period.
(c) After confirmation of a plan, the court may order any entity from whom the debtor receives income to pay
all or any part of such income to the trustee.
Credits
(Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2649; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, §§ 317, 530, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 356,
389; Pub.L, 99-554, Title II, § 283(y), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3118; Pub.L. 105-183, § 4(a), June 19,1998, 112
Stat. 518; Pub.L. 109-8, Title I, § 102(g), (h). Title II, § 213(10), Title III, §§ 306(a), (b), 309(c)(1), 318(2), (3),
Title VII, § 716(a), Apr. 20,2005,119 Stat. 33, 53, 80, 83, 93 129; Pub.L. 109-439, § 2, Dec. 20,2006,120 Stat.
3285; Pub.L. 111-327, § 2(a)(44), Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3562.)
Notes of Decisions (2097)
Current through P.L. 112-24 approved 7-26-11
Footnotes
1
Dollar amount as adjusted by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Adjustment of Dollar Amounts notes
set out under this section and 11 U.S.C.A. § 104.
End of Document
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Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and Issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses
may be signed and served.
(b)(i) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be
served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative.
(b)(ii) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has been timely obtained upon one of them,
(b)(ii)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and
(b)(ii)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons.
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time within which the defendant is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will
be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed
with the court within ten days of service.
(c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the defendant need not answer if the
complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court where the
defendant may call at least 13 days after service to determine if the complaint has been filed.
(c)(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other relief
demanded, and that the complaint Is on file with the court.
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint shall be by one of the folbwjng methods:
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state or judicial district of the United States by the
sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18
years of age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the person to be served refuses
to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient If the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and
offer to deliver a copy thereof. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D) below, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint
to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process;
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the infant
and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care
and control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed;
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting the person's own affairs, by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if one has been
appointed and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody or control of the person;
(d)(1)(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be served if one has been appointed,
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served;
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporatbn not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated association
which Is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one
authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the summons and the complaint to
the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as
having, an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the
person in charge of such office or place of business;
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the recorder;
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the county clerk of such county;
(d)(1)(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
superintendent or business administrator of the board;
( d ) ( l ) ( I ) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the president or
secretary of its board;
(d)(l)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought against the state, by delivering a copy of
the summons and the complaint to the attorney general and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and
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( d ) ( l ) ( K ) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive empbyee or
secretary.
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service.
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(B) or
(d)(1)(C) by mail or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided the defendant signs a
document indicating receipt.
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(l)(I) by mail
or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt.
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the receipt is signed as provided by this
rule.
(d)(3) Service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows:
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other means of
service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice:
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts
of general jurisdiction;
(d)(3)(B)(ii) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or
(d)(3)(B)(iii) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the summons
and the complaint or by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to
the party to be served; or
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court.
(d)(4) Other service.
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through
reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists
good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process may file a
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties.
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication or by other means, provided that the
means of notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The court's order shall also specify, the content of the
process to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed complete. Unless service is by publication, a
copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the process specified by the court.
(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall, upon the request of the party applying
for publication, designate the newspaper in which publication shall be made. The newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of
general circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be published in the English language.
(e) Proof of Service.
(e)(1) If service is not waived, the person effecting service shall file proof with the court. The proof of service must state the date,
place, and manner of service. Proof of service made pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) shall include a receipt signed by the defendant
or defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. If service is made by a person other than
by an attorney, the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, the
proof of service shall be made by affidavit.
(e)(2) Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for service within this state, or by the law of
the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(C), proof of service shall include
a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
(e)(3) Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. The court may allow proof of service to be
amended.
(f) Waiver of Service; Payment of Costs for Refusing to Waive.
(f)(1) A plaintiff may request a defendant subject to service under paragraph (d) to waive service of a summons. The request
shall be mailed or delivered to the person upon whom service is authorized under paragraph (d). It shall include a copy of the
complaint, shall allow the defendant at least 20 days from the date on which the request is sent to return the waiver, or 30 days if
addressed to a defendant outside of the United States, and shall be substantially in the form of the Notice of Lawsuit and Request
for Waiver of Service of Summons set forth in the Appendix of Forms attached to these rules.
(f)(2) A defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to respond to the complaint until 45 days after the date on which
the request for waiver of service was mailed or delivered to the defendant, or 60 days after that date if addressed to a defendant
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(f)(3) A defendant who waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any objectbn to venue or to the jurisdictbn of the
court over the defendant.
(f)(4) If a defendant refuses a request for waiver of service submitted in accordance with this rule, the court shall impose upon the
defendant the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an
answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a
person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a
third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed,
except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made
in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought.
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause
shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an
existing order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit
sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex
parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after
service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a
memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters
raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without
leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of
the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court.
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application
and a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists.
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted
by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain
a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute,
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of
contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents
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cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested.
If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing
in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing
shall be separately identified in the caption of the document containing the request. The court
shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose
of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in
writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in
the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any
order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who
made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five
days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being
served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader Is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or
deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so
much of it as Is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader Intends in good faith to controvert all the
averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he
does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 1 1 .
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideratbn, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver,
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as If there had
been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount
of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(e)(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(e)(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or
defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based
on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 1 1 .
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 9
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is made a party A party may raise an issue as to the
legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative averment, which shall
include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the party relying on such
capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial.
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may
be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended
accordingly.
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet
title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may
describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed
or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on
the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver
that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or
quasi judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision
without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be
made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or
decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material
matter.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically
stated.
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is
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barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any,
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts
the cause of action is so barred.

such statute
or otherwise
allegation is
showing that

(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance
of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its
section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances.
The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and slander.
(j)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set
forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of
which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or
spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such
defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken.
(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to
reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give
in evidence the mitigating circumstances.
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint.
(I) Allocation of fault.
(I)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8
shall file:
(l)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and
(l)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party,
including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is
unknown, the party shall so state.
(I)(2) The information specified in subsection (l)(1) must be included in the party's
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a
reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be
allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery plan under Rule 26(f). The
court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the information
specified in subsection (l)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no
event later than 90 days before trial.
(I)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule.
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Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a)(1) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other
papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title
of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or other paper, and the name, if
known, of the judge (and commissioner if applicable) to whom the case is assigned.
(a)(2) In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but
other pleadings and papers need only state the name of the first party on each side with an
indication that there are other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated
by any name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in the subject
matter of the action."
(a)(3) Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall state in the top left hand
corner of the first page the name, address, email address, telephone number and bar number
of the attorney or party filing the paper, and, if filed by an attorney, the party for whom it is
filed. The plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed cover sheet substantially
similar in form and content to the cover sheet approved by the Judicial Council. The clerk may
destroy the coversheet after recording the information it contains.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All statements of claim or defense shall be made in
numbered paragraphs. Each paragraph shall be limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances; and a paragraph may be adopted by reference in all succeeding pleadings.
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than
denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the
clear presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a paper may be adopted by reference in
a different part of the same or another paper. An exhibit to a paper is a part thereof for all
purposes.
(d) Paper format. All pleadings and other papers, other than exhibits and court-approved
forms, shall be 81/4 inches wide x 11 inches long, on white background, with a top margin of
not less than 2 inches, a right and left margin of not less than 1 inch and a bottom margin of
not less than one-half inch, with text or images only on one side. All text or images shall be
clearly legible, shall be double spaced, except for matters customarily single spaced, and
shall not be smaller than 12-point size.
(e) Signature line. The name of the person signing shall be typed or printed under that
person's signature. If a paper is electronically signed, the paper shall contain the typed or
printed name of the signer with or without a graphic signature.
(f) Non-conforming papers. The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings and other
papers filed with the court. If they are not prepared in conformity with subdivisions (a) - (e),
the clerk shall accept the filing but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared
papers for nonconforming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of
any requirement of this rule.
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(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in any action
or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without notice, authorize a copy
thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original.
(h) No improper content. The court may strike and disregard all or any part of a pleading
or other paper that contains redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.
(i) Electronic papers.
(i)(1) Any reference in these rules to a writing, recording or image includes the electronic
version thereof.
(i)(2) A paper electronically signed and filed is the original.
(i)(3) An electronic copy of a paper, recording or image may be filed as though it were the
original. Proof of the original, if necessary, is governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(i)(4) An electronic copy of a paper shall conform to the format of the original.
(i)(5) An electronically filed paper may contain links to other papers filed simultaneously or
already on file with the court and to electronically published authority.
Advisory Committee Notes

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

Addendum H
Utah R. Civ. P. 41
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Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e) and of any applicable statute, an
action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint
permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state an action based on or including the same claim.
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under
paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request
of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim
can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the
merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provisions of this rule
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall
be made before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of
evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in
any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same
defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously
dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff
has complied with the order.
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(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party dismiss his
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i)
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed
in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
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